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1. Introduction 
Monetary Circuit Theory (henceforth MCT) clearly stands out as one the most rigorous attempts to 
describe the functioning of a monetary economy of production. In doing so, MCT casts light on the 
fundamental links between finance and the real side of the economy in order to allow production 
and consumption decisions to take place. Production processes, for instance, can take place thanks 
to bank money creation by commercial banks that endogenously provide firms with new purchasing 
power in order to allow them to cover production costs. Newly created money first moves from 
firms to households in the form of wage payments. Money refluxes back to firms due to 
households’ consumption expenditure. This allows firms to destroy at least part of initial money 
creation by repaying banks’ loans. Financial markets come into play by intermediating savings and 
giving firms the possibility to pay back the full amount of banks’ credits. In fact, any money that is 
kept idle and is neither spent for consumption goods nor invested in financial assets will remain into 
the circuit, not allowing firms to repay their initial finance. 
Despite the primary MCT concern about financial-real interactions, a few contributions in this 
strand of literature have devoted attention to financialization and its impact on the functioning of a 
monetary economy of production. Eatwell, Mouakil and Taylor (2008), Pilkington (2008), and 
Lavoie (2009) are among the first to include financialization, securitization, and shadow banking 
into a stock-flow-consistent (SFC) framework. 1  They basically extended Godley/Lavoie-type 
balance sheets and flow-of-funds matrices in order to account for a simple macro-aggregated non-
banking’ financial sector.  
Fumagalli and Lucarelli (2011), Seccareccia (2013), Passarella and Sawyer (2013), and 
Passarella (2014) analyze changes in financial-real side relationships in the era of financialization. 
All these contributions note that financialization (also) consists in a sort of reversal in the surplus 
                                                        
1 The SFC literature (see Godley and Lavoie, 2007; Caverzasi and Godin 2014) largely benefited from the theoretical 
framework developed by the monetary circuit theory in its attempt to describe the functioning of a monetary economy 
of production, explicitly taking into account the financial aspects linked with real-side dynamics.  
The SFC approach shares with the MCT the focus on tracking flux and reflux of financial resources among the different 
sectors of the economy and expands it to the accumulation of different types of real and financial stocks. For a deeper 
analysis on the close relationships between these two strands of analysis, see Lavoie (2004).  
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and deficit financial positions traditionally attached to, respectively, households and non-financial 
businesses. On the one hand, commercial banks have expanded money creation in favor of 
households. Accordingly, households have increasingly run into net deficit positions, and 
households’ debt has risen enormously. On the other hand, non-financial corporations have 
increasingly deployed large net savings in financial markets in equity buybacks or the accumulation 
of structured financial assets rather than using them to support real-side investment.  
Notwithstanding these attempts to reconcile financialization with the MCT, Lysandrou (2013) 
argues that circuitists’ attention has been largely misplaced to changes in economic actors’ net 
financial positions, whilst they neglect to describe the terrific push by financial operators toward the 
commodification of financial relationships. Lysandrou considers such a shortcoming as a proof of 
circuit theory in-built inability to describe financialization and consequently the functioning of 
contemporary capitalistic (financialized) economies.  
Albeit disagreeing with Lysandrou when he denies the potential insights deriving from the 
application of the MCT framework to the analysis of financialized economies, we believe that much 
has been overlooked in the literature. In particular, into the theoretical framework of the monetary 
circuit, the abovementioned works only provide a rough description, if any, of the new practices 
that have recently emerged in financial markets and have effectively led to the financialization, 
securitization, and commodification of financial relationships. Yet, the monetary circuit clearly 
shows how money flows among different sectors in order to guide the functioning of a monetary 
economy of production. This same perspective can fruitfully be applied to the financial markets to 
understand the macro dynamics occurring between the different and heterogeneous components of 
the financial system and between the real and the financial side of the economy.  
This paper takes inspiration from the above literature and aims at providing a picture of an 
amended monetary circuit in the era of financialization. However, differently from previous 
contributions, we focus on changes taking place within modern financial systems and on the 
interactions between the different financial sectors and the real side of the economy. Indeed, thank 
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to the use of the Flow of Funds dataset and of the Stock Flow Consistent declination (Lavoie 2004) 
of the monetary circuit, we apply a social accounting perspective to the financial side of the 
economy. This allows us to understand the functional role of the different financial sectors usually 
aggregated under the generic label of “financial system”. In practice we describe new relationships 
connecting real sectors and banks to non-bank financial sectors by means of simple but 
comprehensive graphical and balance sheet analyses of both real side and financial flows of funds. 
In order to do so, this paper also hinges upon some articles about the shadow banking system and 
financial innovations such as asset securitization, sale-and-repurchase agreements (henceforth 
REPOs), and credit default swaps (henceforth CDS) (see Adrian and Shin, 2010; Adrian and 
Ashcraft, 2012; Gorton, 2010; Gorton and Metrick, 2009 and 2010; Stein, 2010). We develop an 
extended scheme of the monetary circuit in which a much more expanded and detailed financial 
sector (al least with respect to previous works) is eventually inserted into traditional real-financial 
relationships. We portray a sort of inside-finance circuit with links and leaks with the real side of 
the economy, and with the standard monetary circuit.2 
Our final object is twofold. First, we try to portray ‘commodification’ practices characterizing 
modern financial systems. Second, and perhaps more relevantly, we provide some insights on the 
effects that new inside-finance mechanisms may have on the functioning of the monetary circuit, on 
the flux and reflux of money, on the way in which the circuit closes. Our paper brings two novelties 
with respect to the two strands of literature cited above. On the on hand, with respect to traditional 
monetary circuit models, we provide a much more detailed description of the functioning of modern 
financial systems, and we shed lights on the otherwise obscure process of financialization. On the 
other hand, with respect to the literature on shadow banking, we depart from its strict 
microeconomic logic. Quite the opposite, we adopt a macroeconomic perspective and try to 
highlight some systemic consequences of financialization by introducing financialization practices 
                                                        
2 In a way, we try to enter much more into the details of what Cingolani (2013) labels and only superficially describes 
as a “double monetary circuit of existing and recycled savings (Cingolani, 2013, p. 2)” that helps explaining 
financialization and asset capital inflation. 
 5 
into the macroeconomic framework of the monetary circuit. In a way, through such a revised, 
updated and, say, financialized version of the monetary circuit, our paper tries to give some hints on 
how recent financial innovations may affect the functioning and the stability of a modern monetary 
economy of production. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents some stylized facts linked to the emerging 
features of modern financial systems before and after the recent financial crash. We identify three 
main dynamics: i) the enormous expansion of credit to households; ii) before-crisis ballooning 
markets for asset-backed securities and the spread of securitization practices; iii) the rise and 
subsequent collapse of new forms of banking such as REPOs. Section 3 compares the traditional 
monetary circuit scheme with an extended version including modern inside-finance interactions. 
Section 3 also translates the logic of the monetary circuit into the language of stock-flow-consistent 
matrices, describing balance sheet and flow-of-funds relationships between real-side and financial 
actors, as well as among different financial agents. Section 4 describes how the financialized 
monetary circuit eventually works and how financialization has altered the development and the 
functioning of the traditional monetary circuit. Section 5 concludes.     
 
 
2. Modern Financial Systems: Some Stylized Facts 
This section aims to identify some stylized facts about financial system’s dynamics and 
financialization in the last forty years. Previous contributions on this point mostly provided a more 
aggregated perspective by only the financial system as a whole. Here we adopt a more 
disaggregated stand. In particular, our main goal is to show how the evolution of financial markets 
reflects on the dimension and composition of the balance sheets of the other sectors of the economy. 
We focus on the US economy due to the large availability of data concerning the composition and 
evolution of financial operators’ balance sheets.  
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Figure 1 clearly shows that the total value of financial assets as a share of GDP remained pretty 
constant until the beginning of the 80s. Thanks to financial deregulation - starting in the second half 
70s and taking momentum in the 80s - the financial side of the economy has been booming, from 
being twice the GDP in 1975 to five times larger in 2013. Financial markets did not merely grow 
dramatically in size, they also mutated their composition. 
 
[FIGURE 1 HERE] 
 
Relying on the social accounting structure used by the Flow of Funds accounting system of the 
FED, we can try to understand the major characteristics of such transformation. Before analyzing 
the data, it is interesting to notice how the complexity of the financial system is mirrored by the way 
in which the Flow of Funds account is structured. The whole US economy is partitioned into six 
main sectors: ‘Households and Non-profit Organizations’, ‘Nonfinancial Business’, ‘State and 
Local Governments’, ‘Federal Government’, ‘Rest of the World’ and ‘Financial Business’.  
Among these sectors, two are further disaggregated. The ‘Nonfinancial Business’, which is 
composed of the Corporate and the Non-corporate sectors, and the ‘Financial Business’. The flow 
of funds identifies sixteen Financial Business’ subsectors, two of which are further portioned for a 
total of twenty-one types of institutions. This work will try to account for the functional role of 
these categories. In Figure 2 we grouped the twenty-one subsectors into nine for the sake of clarity 
and in order to keep adherence to the analysis developed in the following section.3 Figure 2 shows 
the relative size of each sector in which we partitioned the financial system.  
 
                                                        
3 The sector we label as investment funds includes ‘Closed-end Funds’, ‘Exchange-traded funds’, ‘Pension Funds’, and 
‘Mutual Funds’. The broad category ‘Other Financial Institutions’ includes those sectors across the board or marginal to 
the functional roles identified in our analysis (i.e. ‘Funding Corporations’, ‘Real Estate Investment Trusts’, ‘Finance 
Companies’ and ‘Holding Companies’)3. We decided to leave ‘Government-sponsored Enterprises’ in the graph albeit it 
does not appear in the matrices developed later on in the paper. This choice is based on the consideration that, due to its 
heterogeneity the sector could not be included in any of the category identified, however the area of activity of its 
components is at the core of the dynamics investigated in the paper, revolving around credit issuing and securitization.  
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[FIGURE 2 HERE] 
 
What emerges is that the size of ‘Private Depository Institutions’ (which can be considered as a 
proxy for commercial banks) has decreased from above 40% to around 20%. This was due to the 
rapid expansion of financial operators, which were before at the margin of the financial markets. 
We refer to Money Market Mutual Funds (henceforth MMMFs), Issuers of Asset-Backed 
Securities, and Security Brokers and Dealers.4 It is interesting to notice how these “new” key 
sectors were blossoming in the way toward the 2007 subprime crisis and saw their relative 
importance decrease significantly in the aftermath. Another piece of information emerging from the 
graph regards the steep rise in the size of the ‘Government Sponsored Enterprise’ due to both the 
new accounting rules and the role of the GSE in the FED’s quantitative easing. 
The two following graphs refer to the assets held by the whole financial system providing a clear 
depiction of some of the financial dynamics taking place. Figure 3 shows the main categories of 
assets. Figure 4 disaggregates the category ‘Credit Instruments’.  
The major outcome of Figure 3 is an increase in the role of equity, characterized by a certain 
level of volatility whose downturn coincides with the major financial crises of the last decades 
(1987, and most of all 2001 and 2007). The biggest component of assets is ‘credit market 
instruments’. On top of that, Figure 3 also allows to appreciate the growth in the amount of REPOs 
(Federal Funds and Securities REPOs), whose role first increased through the 80s, then stabilized 
since the 90s as one of the major components of the financial system, and finally severely collapsed 
in the aftermath of the crisis.  
 
[FIGURE 3 HERE] 
 
                                                        
4 In this paper, for the sake of simplicity, we will use the expressions ‘investment banks’ and ‘broker and dealers’ as 
synonyms. 
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In Figure 4, we can observe some changes in the composition of the ‘credit market instruments’ 
sub-group. Two dynamics appear to be particularly relevant: first, the pronounced increase in the 
role of mortgages at the detriment of other types of loans, especially in the approaching of the 
crisis; second, the growing importance of securities other than ‘Treasuries Securities’. These two 
dynamics, one linked to mortgages and the other to securitization, are crucial for our analysis and 
will be at the core of our interpretation of a financialized monetary circuit. 
The peculiar dynamic of the REPOs is hard to be seen neatly amidst all the assets included in 
Figure 3 and can be better investigated in Figure 5, which plots the value of the stock of REPOs 
with respect to GDP, both as an asset (continuous line) and as a liability (dotted line), for the 
financial system as a whole, and then specifically for the core sector trading in this assets, namely 
brokers and dealers.  The graph is highly telling. First, it shows the rapid ascent of the value of 
REPOs in the way towards the 2007-2008 financial meltdown and its subsequent vertical collapse 
after the crisis outbreak. Second, it shows that brokers and dealers were by far the main traders of 
this kind of asset. Interestingly, in the years preceding the financial crisis, the increase of REPOs as 
a form of financing of investment banks has been much more marked than its usage by investment 
banks themselves as a possible investment opportunity. 
 
[FIGURE 4 HERE] 
 
The first five Figures make evident the metamorphosis of the financial system. However, what 
was the role of the traditional banking system? The balance sheets of commercial banks changed 
deeply as it emerges from Figure 6. Real estate became the core business, more than doubling its 
relative weight in commercial banks’ balance sheets from around 13% in 1975 to 32% of total 
assets held in the sector just before the crisis.  This had its counterpart in a significant decrease of 
industrial and commercial loans while securities kept a rather stable share around 17%-20%. 
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The effects of the crisis on commercial banks’ balance sheets can be seen in the sudden and 
dramatic interruption of interbank loans in 2007, and in the ensuing major increase in cash assets, 
due to Bernanke’s intervention through the quantitative easing. In social accounting someone’s 
asset is someone else’s liability, likewise this increase in commercial banks’ real estate assets is 
mirrored by the increase in households’ indebtedness, as it can be seen from Figure 7.  
 
[FIGURE 5 HERE]  
[FIGURE 6 HERE] 
[FIGURE 7 HERE] 
 
We will now focus on the sectors that are more relevant to our analysis. Figure 8 plots the value 
of the total assets held by MMMFs (divided by the GDP), and by the value of total assets held by 
the whole financial system. The value of its assets raised from almost scratch at the beginning of the 
80s to a peak of one-fourth of the value of GDP, accounting for 5% of total assets in the financial 
system in 2007. A core element emerging from the graph is the level of volatility. During both the 
‘dot.com’ crisis in 2001 and the subprime crisis, its value diminished dramatically not only with 
respect to GDP, but also with respect to the financial system as whole. This means it experienced 
higher volatility than the rest of the financial system. 
 
[FIGURE 8 HERE] 
 
Figure 9, showing the same graphs for issuers of asset-backed securities, is even more striking. 
The steepness of the rise and the subsequent fall is dramatic. From the beginning of the 80s to 2007, 
the value of the assets held by these new institutions hit roughly one-third of the GDP and 7% of all 
financial assets held by the whole financial sector. Unlike MMMFs, issuers of asset-backed 
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securities appear not have suffered the ‘dot.com’ crisis while the subprime crisis seem to have had a 
devastating effect on these institutions. 
 
[FIGURE 9 HERE] 
 
Securities Brokers and Dealers have experienced a similar path (see Figure 10). In fact, the size 
of its balance has been steadily expanding from the beginning of the 80s until the subprime crisis, 
both with respect to GDP (investment banks’ assets-to-GDP ratio reached 32.6% in 2007 from 
1.1% in 1975) and to the whole financial sector (6.9% in 2007 from 0.5% in 1975). All these three 
sectors appear not to have recovered from the sub-prime crisis, exhibiting a smaller balance sheet 
than in 2007. 
Finally, according to Figure 11, ‘Investment Funds’ have become the main components of the 
financial system and have kept a rather stable relative quota within the financial system, 
approximately around 30-35% of its size. This sector experienced different trends with respect to 
asset-backed security issuers, MMMFs, and Security Broker and Dealers. Unlike the former, it saw 
its balance sheet shrinking as a consequence of the two crises (dot.com and sub-prime). Unlike the 
previous three groups, it seems to have fully recovered, and its balance sheet is now larger than it 
was before the crisis (still with respect to the GDP).  
 
[FIGURE 10 HERE] 
[FIGURE 11 HERE] 
 
To sum up, we can highlight the main stylized fact emerging in this section. First, the financial 
sector has been bloating with respect to the output of the economy. Second, commercial banks have 
been increasingly focusing their business on mortgages. Third, the household sector has got 
increasingly indebted. Fourth, three sectors experienced a boom heading the 2007 crisis and have 
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not recovered since then, namely Money Market Mutual Funds, ABS Issuers and Securities Brokers 
and Dealers. Finally, Investment Funds have become the core sector of the financial system and 
fully recovered after the crisis. In the following section, we will try to find an explanation for these 
stylized facts.  
 
 
 
 
3. The Traditional Monetary Circuit and its Financialized Version: A Comparison 
3.1 The traditional version of the monetary circuit 
Figure 12 portrays the logic of a traditional monetary circuit into a closed economic system in 
which government and central bank are also considered alongside private economic agents. 
Furthermore, in Figure 12 we show the relationships between economic actors that mainly pertain 
to the real side of the economy (i.e. non-financial businesses, households, government) and 
financial operators. In line with the logic of the traditional monetary circuit theory, financial 
institutions are subdivided into commercial banks on the one hand and market-based institutions, 
say investment banks and institutional investors such as investment and pension funds, on the other 
hand. While the formers are the providers of initial finance, investment banks and institutional 
investors intermediate part of households savings through financial market mechanisms hence 
making the closure of the circuit possible providing firms with a further source of final finance, next 
to proceeds from sales. The all set of financial operators we consider constitutes the financial sphere 
of the economy. In figure 12, the dashed red line recollecting financial institutions represents the 
relative dimension  of the financial side of the economy with respect to the real side.  
In Figure 12 the arrows connecting various economic agents to each other stand for the creation 
and circulation of money (i.e. means of payments in the form of cash or, more relevantly, bank 
money). We draw couples of bi-directional arrows in the case of linkages between the real side and 
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the financial side of the economy. In our mind, they stand for double-entry bookkeeping principles 
informing financial relationships’ accounting. The creation and provision of new purchasing power 
by commercial banks in favor of non-financial businesses through initial finance is mirrored by the 
transcription of new loans on the asset side of commercial banks’ balance sheets. 
According to the standard monetary circuit story, circulation of money opens with initial finance, 
i.e. new bank money that commercial banks create on demand, mainly from the non-financial 
business sector.5 After this opening stage, new bank money flows from firms to households in the 
form of wages. In the representation of the circuit put forward in Figure 12, we included the public 
sector. Government purchases goods from firms and pay wages to households. Within this 
framework, the central bank endogenously advances new base money to commercial banks in order 
to allow them to meet their reserve requirements and let the payment system to work smoothly. This 
departs from the original representation of the circuit as conceived by Graziani (2003), according to 
which the nexus between private banks and non-financial firms is the key element of monetary 
interactions underlying the production process of capitalist economies. 
Households get loans from commercial banks to finance durable goods consumption and/or, 
more typically, home buying. Households’ expenditures and government purchases imply money 
moving from their bank account back to firms. In addition to it, households allocate their savings 
among liquid and illiquid assets. Variations in the stock of households’ demand deposits represent 
new money remaining (i.e. not destroyed) at the end of the circuit once consumption decisions and 
the allocation of savings among different assets have taken place.  
According to the endogenous money theory, such a new money creation is the outcome of initial 
loans provided by commercial banks. In general, savings in the form of illiquid assets pass through 
the mechanisms of financial markets from surplus units (households) to deficit units (non-financial 
business and government). Revenues from selling of goods and services, as well as resources 
recollected on financial markets, are the final finance, which eventually allows firms (and 
                                                        
5 In a chartalist approach, also government initially finances its expenditures through new liquidity stretched by banks.  
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government) to repay initial loans. In this way, the new money created at the beginning of the 
circuit thanks to initial finance is at least partially destroyed at the end of the circuit.  
Three points are worth stressing as to the logic of the traditional monetary circuit story as 
described so far and graphically represented in Figure 12. 
First, the behaviors of financial actors and the financial sphere of the economy are described as 
functional to the real side. Financial actors create new resources or intermediate existing ones in 
order to make real sector production and consumption decisions possible. In a way, the financial 
system could not exist without the real side of the economy and vice versa.  
Second, commercial banks and market-based financial institutions represent different parts of the 
financial world absolving different functions and without close tights among each other as 
originally imposed by the Glass-Steagall Act. In the traditional monetary circuit story, these 
institutions somehow perform complementarily, but well-distinguished functions. 
Third, economic agents are clearly divided into surplus units, namely households, and deficit 
units, namely firms and government. Despite the existence of consumption loans and mortgages, 
households emerge as economic units running financial surpluses. Firms and governments, on the 
contrary, are the natural destinations of final finance. They issue corporate bonds, equities, and 
government bonds in order to finance their investment projects and repay initial loans.  
We present a more formal accounting of the relationships portrayed in figure 12 through the 
flow-of-funds (fof) Matrix 1a reported below. It resembles the one provided by Lavoie (2004) in a 
previous paper on the logical contiguity between the monetary circuit theory and the more recent 
SFC analysis of complex economic systems. Matrix 1a below extends the previous representation 
provided by Lavoie (2004) by explicitly considering market-based financial institutions. 
In order to maintain things as simple as possible, we revert to the original circuit. In Matrix 1a, 
we neglect to consider public institutions such as government and central bank. Consistently with 
Figure 12, Matrix 1a shows the central role of commercial banks as providers of new funds 
enabling economic agents to take economic decisions and the monetary circuit to open. New loans 
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conceded to firms (ΔL) allow them to implement production decisions (i.e. pay wages W to 
households) and undertake investment plans (ΔK). New mortgages to households (ΔM) allow them 
to buy houses (ΔpH). From the ‘capital column’ of commercial banks, it clearly emerges the ‘loans-
create-deposits’ logic of the endogenous money theory.  
 
[FIGURE 12 HERE] 
 
The block of current transactions in Matrix 1a (upper-left part of matrix 1a) shows that, beyond 
wages, households also receive interest payments on accumulated deposits (iDh) from commercial 
banks, and rents on shares of tradable financial assets (iSh) from market-based financial institutions 
(MBB).6 Part of households’ total disposable income is spent for consumption purposes (C). Part of 
it is used to pay interests on mortgages (iM). Savings (SAV) are then allocated among increases in 
liquid assets ( a variation of demand deposits ΔDh), increasing shares of tradable financial assets 
(ΔSH) and newly purchased houses. In this regard, according to the traditional monetary circuit, the 
more households abstain from consumption and accumulate liquid assets, the lower will be firms’ 
capacity to repay back initial loans. A larger quantity of initial bank money will eventually remain 
in the circuit and not be destroyed.  
As far as non-financial firms are concerned, on top of new loans from banks in order to cover 
current production expenditures, they get revenues from selling goods on the good market. They 
also get interests on banks’ deposits (iDf). Last but not least, non-financial firms issue corporate 
bonds (O) on financial markets, purchased by financial intermediaries. In the jargon of the 
monetary circuit literature, this represents final finance.  
On the one hand, non-financial firms deploy available resources in order to meet interest 
payments on banks’ loans and issued bonds, and to repay loans and/or bonds coming at maturity, 
                                                        
6 For the sake of simplicity, here we do not distinguish between bond holdings or equity holding as different investment 
instruments and alternative investment opportunities from the point of view of final savers. We assume them to be 
encompassed in the general category of ‘financial operators’ shares’. 
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i.e. ‘hidden’ negative terms behind net variations of ‘Lf’ and ‘O’. On the other hand, they 
accumulate assets in the form of illiquid new capital goods (ΔK) or variations in banks’ deposits 
(ΔDf). F stands for non-financial firms’ profits. For the sake of simplicity, we assume them not to 
be distributed. 
Commercial banks create (bank) money ex nihilo through their activity of conceding new loans 
and mortgages. Accordingly, commercial banks receive interests on outstanding loans and pay 
interests on deposits (D). Profits are Fb. Once again, for the sake of simplicity, we assume they are 
not distributed.  
Non-bank financial institutions intermediate (part of) household savings by issuing securities, 
say investment funds’ shares (ΔSH), and buying newly issued corporate bonds (ΔO). Current 
transactions of non-bank financial institutions, i.e. interests’ proceeds, and payments, originate 
correspondingly to the above financial positions. Again, profits Fmb are not distributed and, for 
simplicity, take the form of new liquid assets (iDm). 
 
[MATRIX 1 HERE] 
 
The above flow of funds determines variations in the accumulated amount of agents’ assets and 
liabilities, hence in economic agents’ net worth (NW). Matrix 1b below reports assets held and 
liabilities issued by the several institutions we have considered so far. In Matrix 1b, we assume all 
economic agents other than commercial banks’ hold banks’ deposits as liquid assets. While this is 
obviously true in the case of households, it might appear an unrealistic assumption in the case of 
non-bank financial operators and non-financial firms, large corporations at least. In our mind, such 
an assumption simply sheds light on commercial banks as pivotal institutions at the core of the 
payment system. While households may hold bank deposits as a store of value, other actors hold 
banks deposits mainly for everyday payments. 
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[MATRIX 1B HERE] 
 
3.2 An amended financialized monetary circuit 
There is no doubt that since 1970s the process of financial deregulation and financialization has 
radically changed the way financial institutions work and interact with the real economy, at least 
with respect to the prototype of the monetary circuit scheme considered above. In Figure 13, we 
portray an amended monetary circuit in which we try to introduce some relevant changes that have 
affected the financial side of the economy in the last three decades.7 Our representation of a modern 
financialized economy heavily hinges upon the emerging literature on the shadow bank system 
(Adrian and Shin, 2010; Adrian and Ashcraft, 2012; Gorton, 2012; Gorton and Metrick, 2009 and 
2010, Stein, 2010). Herein we list up some points of departures from our description of a 
financialized economy, as reported in figure 13, with respect to the traditional monetary circuit 
illustrated in figure 12. 
First, similarly to Figure 12, interactions between the financial sphere and the real side of the 
economy are portrayed through black arrows. On the contrary, red arrows stand for burgeoning 
financial relationships inside the financial system. In this regard, what is changed with respect to 
Figure 12 is the intensity of some financial-real side relationships and/or their causal direction. On 
the right hand side of Figure 13, the bold lines between commercial banks and households stand for 
the expansion of consumption loans and mortgages, and the ensuing increase in households’ debt 
exposure towards the financial system (see Orhangazi, 2011; Passarella and Sawyer, 2013; 
Passarella, 2014). On the left-hand side of Figure 13, bold lines between non-financial businesses 
and the financial system now go both ways instead of being one-way. The logic is that several non-
financial companies, in particular big corporations, have moved from being ‘deficit units’ searching 
for external finance into ‘surplus units’ running financial surpluses. Non-financial firms have 
                                                        
7 It is almost impossible to formally represent and model all different relationships connecting financial operators each 
other. Nonetheless, at the best of our knowledge, Figure 13 stands out as the first attempt to formally portray into a 
monetary circuit at least part of  the complex financial linkages characterizing modern financial systems.  
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diverted an increasing amount of resources towards the acquisition of financial assets instead of 
financing physical investment (Stockhammer, 2004; Crotty, 2005; Orhangazi, 2008 and 2011; 
Demir, 2009; Passarella, 2014). 
Second, several contributions even from a mainstream tradition describes finance as an 
expanding industry in modern developed economies accounting for an increasing share of their 
GDP (Cecchetti and Kharroubi, 2012; Beck et al., 2014; Law and Singh, 2014). In Figure 13, the 
boundaries of the financial sphere, traced by the red dashed lines, are much wider than what 
portrayed in Figure 12. In our mind, this represents the expansion of the financial system with 
respect to the real side.  
Third, the financial block of Figure 13 tries to account for some of the inside-finance changes 
discussed in Section 2, which have been basically overlooked by traditional monetary circuits. In 
Figure 13, bold letters are meant to stress the increasing importance MMMFs have gained in 
worldwide financial systems as deposit-like issuer institutions alternative to commercial banks. 
Moreover, the large size of the investment bank box (at least with respect to what plot in Figure 12) 
captures the empirical evidence on the growing importance of brokers and dealers as fundamental 
market-makers institutions. In a way, it graphically portrays the impressive growth of investment 
banks’ balance sheets (Adrian and Shin, 2010; Gorton and Metrick, 2010), at least until the 
outbreak of the 2007-2008 financial crisis. It also underlines investment banks’ crucial role in 
generating a ‘self-feeding financial circuit’ that is partially decoupled from the real side circuit (see 
below). Last but not least, in the upper-right part of the financial block of Figure 13 we explicitly 
take into account insurance companies as distinct operators with respect to other financial 
institutions. We do this in order to take onboard the fact that insurance companies have remarkably 
changed and extended the range of activities with respect to their very traditional function of 
savings intermediation. The case of American International Group’s participation in over-the-
counter derivative markets as providers of CDS contracts clearly stands out as the most astonishing 
example of such a change (Kane, 2013). 
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Fourth, modern financial systems feature the increasing evaporation of the traditional distinction 
between bank-centered financial institutions/relationships and market-based actors/links as imposed 
by the post-WWII tight regulation of the financial system. Since the mid 1970s, financial 
deregulation, the emergence and diffusion of securitization, Special Purpose Vehicles (henceforth 
SPV), REPOs, and new types of derivative products such as CDS have made this separation 
increasingly blurred and difficult to determine. Financial operators have started to run an increasing 
large variety of activities and engage in dense financial networks. Previously well-detached and 
carefully distinguished financial institutions have become increasingly intertwined in an 
extraordinary complex system of connections. Red arrows in the financial box of Figure 13 get at 
least a small part of such a messy tangle. They describe the emergence in the last decades of a sort 
of financial circuit that is partially delinked from the real side of the economy. 
 
 
3.2.1 Building blocks a financialized monetary circuit 
Despite the outburst of the financial system as partially detached from the real economy, the run-up 
to the most recent worldwide financial crisis and the ensuing ‘Great Recession’ suggest that 
financial system’s grip on overall economic dynamics is perhaps stronger than ever. On the one 
hand, a burgeoning financial activity and an expanding financial circuit might positively spur real 
side economic activity (Boyer, 2000; Aglietta, 2000; Van Treeck, 2008; Hein, 2011). On the other 
hand, such a dynamics is likely unstable. A brief description of the building blocks of our 
financialized monetary circuit may help to explain how it may influence, and perhaps destabilize, 
overall economic performances. 
In the bottom part of Figure 13, commercial banks still perform their peculiar function of 
creating new purchasing power ex-nihilo. They continue to provide initial finance to both non-
financial businesses and households. With respect to Figure 12, loans to households have become 
relatively more important than loans conceded to other actors. Further, commercial banks may now 
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create money when they take part to REPO agreements as lending counterparts of other financial 
institutions, typically investment banks. 
After creation, bank money circulates through the circuit. On the one hand, non-financial firms 
use it to pay wages and undertake production activity, as well as to accumulate assets, both 
productive and unproductive financial ones. On the other hand, households allocate their disposable 
income (wages plus interests income) between consumption and savings. Investment banks may use 
liquidity obtained through REPOs to expand their business, open new financial positions and 
accumulate new assets, say asset-backed securities (henceforth ABS).    
A significant departure with respect to Figure 12 and the standard functioning of the monetary 
circuit emerges. This is the newly available option of allocating savings among different financial 
instruments through the intermediation of different financial institutions. There are some 
differences with regards to both the demand side (which type of assets savers/financial operators do 
demand) and the supply side (which kind of assets financial operators do offer). On to demand, we 
already mentioned to a sort of inversion of net deficit and surplus financial positions between non-
financial firms, large corporations in particular, and households. In the case of non-financial firms, 
profits may remain ‘liquid’ and take the form of MMMFs shares8 rather than being used to finance 
productive investment. MMMFs will in turn use these funds in order to acquire (apparently) liquid 
assets such as asset-backed commercial papers (henceforth ABCP), or to take part in REPO 
agreements vis-à-vis investment banks. MMMFs, together with investment banks, stand out as 
relevant purchasers of ABCPs (MMMF in particular) and ABSs (Adrian and Shin, 2010; Gorton 
and Metrick, 2010). 9  
                                                        
8 This is particularly true when realized profits are larger than the threshold amount of demand deposits guaranteed by 
the federal deposit insurance. 
9 Following Gorton (2010), and Gorton and Metrick (2010), there are at least two good reasons that made ABSs appear 
as liquid, attractive, and information-insensitive investment options to a vast series of financial operators. First, pooling 
and tranching techniques characterizing securitization make ABSs seemingly riskless assets. Second, when commercial 
banks’ assets are moved off their own balance sheet into SPVs balance sheets, they get bankruptcy-remote to direct 
creditors of the originating banks. Commercial banks’ direct creditors cannot advance any claim on these assets in the 
event that the originating banks will fail. The high safety degree of SPVs assets is in turn translated into the allegedly 
high safety level of the corresponding liabilities since that purchasers of SPV-issued ABSs will support relatively low 
creditors’ risks. MMMFs demanded large quantities of short-term ABCPs as remunerative and secure assets. 
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On the supply side, the burgeoning (at least until the outbreak of the 2007-2008 financial crisis) 
supply of rather new financial instruments such as ABS, ABCP, and collateralized-debt-obligations 
(henceforth CDO) has been largely dependent on the securitization of loans or mortgages by 
commercial banks. In the last decade, commercial banks have increasingly replaced the traditional 
‘originate and hold’ practice with the ‘originate, repackage and distribute’ practice (Gorton and 
Pennacchi, 2005; Parlour and Plantin, 2008; Wray, 2007). In the bottom part of Figure 13, we 
describe it in the simplest way possible.10 Part of commercial banks assets is pulled and moved off 
their own balance sheets into legally distinguished entities such as SPV. SPV, in turn, buy 
commercial banks’ assets thanks to resources recollected on financial markets by selling ABSs and 
ABCPs to MMMFs and investment banks. From the point of view of commercial banks, 
securitization allows them to transform illiquid assets into marketable ones, and to sell them on 
financial markets in exchange for liquidity. It represents an indirect source of cheap finance through 
off-balance sheet mechanisms. Even more, securitization allows commercial banks to manage their 
own balance sheet in a flexible way, to gain margins of maneuver to further expand their own 
business, and to create more space for opening up new financial positions while still benefitting and 
profiting from previously created and then sold assets. When commercial banks sell assets to SPVs, 
they downsize the asset side of their balance sheet. Correspondingly, some liquid liabilities are 
destroyed, let say SPVs deposits. If we assume some commercial banks’ core capital to exist, 
commercial banks’ equity-asset ratio improves and leverage decreases, at least figuratively, after 
securitization. Commercial banks will now present more solid balance sheets and have a chance to 
expand their asset portfolio newly.11  
Investment banks can finance ABSs purchases by issuing bonds to investment funds and 
insurance companies (see upper-right part of the financial block in figure 13). Beyond this, they 
have increasingly recurred to REPOs as short-term means of financing (see Adrian and Shin, 2010; 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
Investment banks purchased increasing amounts of ABSs to be used as collaterals into REPO agreements and derivative 
contracts. The expanding supply of ABSs was functional to ballooning brokers’ and dealers’ economic activity. 
10 See Pozsar et al. (2013) on the complexity of securitization practices and the functioning of shadow banking. 
11 See Appendix A for a simple illustrative numerical example on these mechanisms. 
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Gorton and Metrick, 2009 and 2010; Stein, 2010). In the bottom-right part of figure 13, MMMFs 
stand out as relevant counterparts of investment banks into REPOs agreements.12 Even further, a 
self-feeding inner-finance cycle emerges in the event that commercial banks provide investment 
banks with fresh money through REPOs, and investment banks in turn use these resources to buy 
ABSs implicitly supplied by commercial banks themselves through securitization (see more on this 
in section 4).13  
Before August 2007, overconfidence in ABSs as safe and liquid assets was strengthened by the 
possibility to hedge financial positions through CDS contracts (see the top-right part of the financial 
block in figure 13). The supply of CDS represents a significant discontinuity in the kind of financial 
services traditionally offered by insurance companies.14 CDSs allow CDS sellers to gain streams of 
payments in exchange for protection against default risks on insured assets. Insured financial 
institutions obviously buy CDSs in order to hedge risks in open financial positions, and increase the 
(perception of) solidity of their balance sheet. Even more, they can purchase CDS contracts as a 
remunerative ‘autonomous’ investment opportunity regardless of the existence of any insurable 
interest. Needles to say, the outgrowth of CDS contracts helped fueling financial cycles and 
financial hyperactivity in time of ‘bonanza’. At the same time, they contributed to the spreading of 
the subprime crisis to the whole financial system and jeopardized the financial solidity of too-big-
to-fail (or too-interconnected-to-fail) insurance companies such as AIG. 
 
[FIGURE 13 HERE] 
 
3.2.2. Financial circuits into matrices 
                                                        
12 MMMFs perceived REPOs as profitable substitutes for liquid demand deposits due to the guarantees provided by 
allegedly riskless ABSs (rather than federal deposit insurances) used as collaterals in REPO contracts. 
13  The self-feeding nature of such an inner-finance cycle appears even clearer if one thinks that REPOs are 
collateralized by ABSs. 
14 A much wider range of financial institutions beyond insurance companies have taken an active role in underwriting 
CDS contacts. Here we put emphasis on insurance companies only in order to stress the significant change CDS-linked 
operations have triggered off with respect to traditional insurance companies’ core business.   
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The balance sheet composition and the ensuing flow of funds emerging in the financialized 
monetary circuit drawn in Figure 13 are analyzed more formally in the matrices reported below. A 
butch of works has already attempted to describe the functioning of shadow banking through the 
mechanisms of stock-flow-consistent matrices (Eatwell, Mouakil and Taylor, 2008; Pilkington, 
2008; Lavoie, 2009). Here we follow the same approach but we present a more detailed picture by 
taking explicitly into account the several actors composing the shadow banking system, as well as 
some specific asset they use in their operations. We start by presenting matrices 2a and 2b, in which 
we describe in the simplest possible way the very essence of securitization. We end up with the 
highly complex Matrices 3a and 3b, in which all the financial actors portrayed in figure 13 are 
eventually considered.15 In building Matrices 3a and 3b, we relied on the data gathered from the US 
Flow of Funds, to offer a realistic albeit simplified representation of the balance interconnections 
underling the private sector of the US economy. Nonetheless, for the sake of parsimony, numerous 
simplifications were required. In fact, a quintessential characteristic of financialization is the 
increasing complexity of the financial markets, which substantiates at the macro level in the 
intricate interconnections between the balance sheets of the different sectors. The number of assets 
and financial sectors blossomed. We tried to identify the functional role of each sector and to focus 
exclusively on the key assets.16 
Matrix 2a partially extends the representation of current financial systems already proposed by 
Eatwell, Moukil and Taylor (2008). Here we explicitly take into account the operation of both SPVs 
and market-based financial operators. Assets and liabilities connected to securitization are in bold 
letters. In Matrix 2a, commercial banks provide loans and mortgages to households and non-
financial firms. However, differently from Matrix 1b, a fraction ‘z’ of these assets is securitized and 
sold to SPVs. SPVs liabilities are represented by ABSs that are purchased by market-based 
                                                        
15 The different and sequential degrees of complexity that can be taken into account in the passage from matrices 2a and 
2b to matrices 3a and 3b are reported in matrices B1.1, B1.2, B2.1 and B2.2 reported in Appendix B to this paper. 
16 Arguably the heaviest simplification is the exclusion of equities, which, as shown in figure 3 (section 2), have 
significantly increased their role in the financial markets since the 80s.  The functional role of equities in or analysis is 
captured by the non-financial firms’ obligations.  
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financial operators. Once again, commercial banks lie at the center of the payment system. 
Households and non-financial firms hold demand deposits in order to store wealth in the most liquid 
form possible. This is particularly true in the event financial turbulences render demand deposits 
safer and more appealing assets than long-term assets such as shares of market-based operators 
(SHlt). In the case of financial institutions such as SPVs and financial intermediaries, banks’ 
deposits play a purely instrumental role. They might be thought as slightly positive or, for most of 
the time, close-to-zero liquid holdings in financial operators’ balance sheets that allow payments 
services to be effectively carried out, since they are instrumental to the use of credit money.  
 
[MATRIX 2A HERE] 
  
Matrix 2b describes the flow of funds characterizing such an economic system. It thus takes 
explicitly into account flows of funds that originate from securitized assets, as well as new rounds 
of securitization.  
[MATRIX 2B HERE] 
 
The main departures with respect to Matrix 1a are reported in bold. These are related to the, let 
say, ‘accounting effects’ of securitization. More in details, a fraction ‘z’ of interest proceeds 
accruing to commercial banks on originated loans and mortgages are now diverted to SPVs.  SPVs, 
in turn, pay interests to ABS holders. For the sake of simplicity, we assume SPVs not to make 
profits. All proceeds from held assets are transferred to ABS holders. From the point of view of 
market-based financial operators, interests on ABS holdings constitute an additional source of 
profits beyond interests gained on non-financial firm bond holdings (iO). 
In the bottom part of Matrix 2b we consider new rounds of securitization of newly created loans 
and mortgages: (z)ΔLf and (z)ΔM. Accordingly, we also model new ABS issuances by SPVs (i.e. 
ΔABS). Market-based financial operators may deploy resources recollected from households in 
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order to increase their holding of ABSs.  To the eyes of market-based financial operators, ABSs 
appear as a remunerative investment opportunities alternative to non-financial firms’ bonds (O). 
Accordingly, households’ savings may not flow from households to real-sector firms any longer 
through financial market intermediation. Savings could remain ‘entrapped’ in the financial sphere 
of the economy. Eventually, finance could crowd out non-financial firms.   
In Matrices 3a and 3b, we represent the full-fledged financialized monetary circuit portrayed in 
figure 13. In Matrix 3a, we first take into account a rentier sector in order to take on board the 
increasing inequality with which personal income and, in particular, personal wealth is distributed 
among economic actors.17 Household gets loans and mortgages from commercial banks. The only 
assets they hold are liquid demand deposits and houses. On the contrary, on the asset side of 
rentiers’ balance sheet, we report most of non-business sector’s financial wealth. This takes the 
form of short-term MMMFs shares (SHstR) or long-term (riskier) investment funds’ and/or 
insurance companies’ shares (SHlt). Rentiers also hold demand deposits Dr. This can be expected to 
represent a relatively small part of total rentiers’ wealth. We also assume that real-side firms deploy 
profits, banks’ credit or funds recollected on financial markets to purchase finance assets in the 
form of money market mutual funds’ shares.  
In Matrix 3a, we disaggregate the market-based financial sector in: money market mutual funds, 
investment funds, broker and dealers, insurance companies. MMMFs issue short-term liquid assets 
in order to finance purchases of ABCPs, and provide liquidity to broker and dealers through REPOs. 
Investment funds may allocate resources to a variety of assets. First, they may still perform their 
traditional function of conveying recourses towards non-financial firms by purchasing non-financial 
firms’ obligations (OF). Second, differently from what implicitly assumed in Matrices 1b and 2a, 
investment funds may also buy obligations issued by investment banks (OFF) or ABSs/CDOs. The 
larger investment funds’ propensity to accumulate inner-finance assets such as ABS and CDOs, the 
lower the amount of final finance that eventually allow non-financial firms to repay initial banks’ 
                                                        
17 See Goda and Lysandrou (2014), and Lysandrou and Nesvetailova (2014) on the role of wealth concentration in 
feeding the demand for ABSs and CDOs.   
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loans. Last but not least, investment funds may try to make their financial position safer by taking 
positions on derivative markets and buying CDSs from insurance companies. In Matrix 3a, we do 
not classify CDSs as assets nor as liabilities. Actually, their positive or negative values depend on 
the occurrence of contingent events (the default of the underlying assets). They will give rise to 
payment commitments (i.e. premia to insurance companies) or rights to receive payments 
depending on the prevailing state of the economy.  
 
[MATRIX 3A HERE] 
[MATRIX 3B HERE] 
 
In Matrix 3a, insurance companies can invest in obligations issued by both non-financial firms 
and investment banks. We assume them not to buy ABSs. Yet, they increasingly take an active part 
in derivative markets by offering CDS contracts to other financial operators. The 2007-2008 
financial collapse has clearly shown us that such an activity may constitute a risky ‘boomerang’ for 
the financial solidity of insurance companies. 
Broker and dealers can recollect funds by both issuing obligations (OFF) and/or entering short-
term REPO agreements with commercial banks and MMMFs. They will use these resources in 
order to buy non-financial firms’ obligations and/or ABSs. Once again, the latter represents a new 
and alternative investment opportunity with respect to the traditional investment bank activity of 
financing long-term real economy projects. Such an alternative gets even more attractive since that 
investment banks can use ABSs as collaterals in REPO agreements or to open new positions on 
derivative markets. In the end, ABSs holdings may be preferred to the traditional financing of real-
side activities because they allow investment banks to fast expand their business by ballooning their 
balance sheets. 
Matrix 3b reports all the complex network of flow of funds, financial flows in particular (i.e. 
interest payments/proceeds as well as investment opportunities for the wide set of financial asset 
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available), that emanates from balance sheets included in Matrix 3a. The economic rationale behind 
matrix 3a is equal to that one informing the computation of Matrix 2b and does not need further 
explanations.18 
 
4 Grasping the nature of the financial circuits 
The flow of diagram and the matrices above unveil the internal structure of the financial system, 
making explicit the interactions that take place within the financial system and between the 
financial and the real side of the economy. In order to grasp the nature of these relations, their 
driving forces, and their impact on the economic system, we will revert to the MCT logic. A 
cornerstone of the circuit is its clear-cut explanation of the central role played by money in the 
production process of a capitalist economy. Money, when it enters the circuit, [is not neutral, as it] 
first allows production to take place and then commodities to be exchanged. Money, when it 
refluxes, [is not neutral as] leaves someone richer (those who have saved) and someone poorer 
(those with an increased stock of debt not matched by an increase in assets), may it be units or 
sectors. A further crucial development of the MCT is the identification of the functional role of each 
sector. In its original form, commercial banks create money, firms get indebted to produce and pay 
wages, households work and consume, and the financial system vehicles households’ saving to 
firms allowing the circuit to close. Looking at the financialized economy schematized in the 
previous sections through these two lenses, i.e. the role of money and the functional role of each 
sector, MCT may allow us to find a meaningful answer to the above questions. 
In our extended monetary circuit, on top of loans to non-financial firms, money may enter the 
economy through two further channels. The first one corresponds to the debts of the households, i.e. 
mortgages and loans. The second one consists of the debt of investment banks when they are 
financed by commercial banks through REPOs. Regardless the specific origin of these new 
                                                        
18 In Matrix 3b, payment flows associated to CDSs are reported with both a positive and negative sign. Indeed, CDSs 
give rise to payable or receivable amounts according to the contingent state of the underlying asset. The 2007 financial 
shock has abruptly transformed insurance companies’ receivables into huge payable amounts, this way shattering the 
solidity of the whole financial system. 
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financial relations, the ensuing debts require a source of final finance to be repaid. We can, 
therefore, identify to new (sub-) circuits. 
The former circuit opens when commercial banks create new deposits by granting new loans 
(ΔL) and/or mortgages (ΔM) to households. For the time being, let us assume an aggregated 
households sector and temporarily neglect the distinction between workers and rentiers.  This 
inflow of money is the new initial finance. This newly created money appears in the balance sheets 
of both sectors involved at the same time as an asset and a liability, deposits (ΔD) and 
loans/mortgages (ΔL and or ΔM) for households, and vice versa for commercial banks. If this credit, 
or a part of it (z, in our matrices), enters the securitization process, an equal amount of money 
refluxes to commercial banks and is therefore destroyed. Even though the layers of intermediation 
are numerous, each of the financial operators involved, may it be SPVs, MMMFs, investment banks 
or investment funds, needs to use its own deposits to purchase securitized assets or ABSs. No 
matters neither the layers of intermediation, nor the amount of time the original credit is pooled and 
included in sophisticated financial instruments. When a credit enters the securitization circuit, an 
equal amount of deposits is destroyed. Money unavoidable returns to the issuer of the loans, which 
is at the same time the seller of the original securitized asset. At this stage of the analysis, it is 
important to keep in mind that financial operators are intermediaries. Therefore, they need to 
recollect their clients’ (i.e. households) savings to purchase securitized assets and/or derivative 
products ‘constructed’ on them (i.e. ABSs). In the end, households’ deposits, which increased with 
the initial finance, are the source of money for the circuit to close (the final finance of the original 
circuit). To sum up, in this circuit money flows through the economy following three steps. First, 
money enters through a loan of commercial banks and takes the form of household deposit. Second, 
households save and use part of this money to purchase assets issued by financial intermediaries, 
say financial operators’ shares (ΔSH). Correspondingly, financial intermediaries’ deposits will 
increase. Third, financial operators will use their deposits to purchase securitized assets and ABS 
from commercial banks via SPVs, hence destroying the money.  
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What emerges from these steps is a key evolution of such a financial circuit, i.e. the 
commodification of financial relationships. Money, whose role as ‘existence condition of [material] 
production’ (Parguez, 2003, p.255) was so clear in the original circuit, gains an additional 
connotation in this financialized economy. Indeed, money is still needed for production (also of 
financial system’s services) and still allows for the transaction. Money is still created through debt, 
and it is at the same time an asset and a liability. Financial markets now take advantage of this 
double role, so that the asset counterpart of households’ or firms’ debt, the initial finance of the 
circuit, becomes the commodity produced by financial operators and exchanged in financial 
markets. Parguez’s essentiality axiom has never held truer.  
Through the mechanisms of this circuit, debt is manipulated and indirectly (through financial 
operators’ shares and securitization) sold by workers of the financial system to households, which 
in most cases are at the same time the owner of the original liability. However, this situation is far 
from being a clearing mechanism, the consequences on the economy are numerous, and their effects 
do not terminate when money returns to the commercial banks.  
First of all, the destruction of money through the passages of securitization creates a deep 
discontinuity with respect to the outcomes of the traditional monetary circuit. According to the 
traditional monetary circuit portrayed in Figure 12 and in Matrices 1a-1b, the more commercial 
banks recollected liquidity through demand deposits, the more banks’ money remained in the 
circuit and the less the circuit closed. A lower amount of initial banks’ loans were repaid. They 
remained on the asset side of commercial banks’ balance sheets. Accordingly, banks might have 
been inhibited to further expand their business due to the ensuing increase in leverage and the rise 
in their financial vulnerability. In Figure 13, securitization now implies that money initially created 
by commercial banks is eventually destroyed when banks sell the corresponding assets to SPVs. 
However, money destruction is now decoupled by asset destruction and debt repayment by initial 
borrowers. Borrowers’ initial liabilities are still on, but they do not figure on commercial banks’ 
balance sheets any longer. They are now polled in the balance sheet of other financial operators, 
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and figuratively incorporated in ABSs. From an aggregated perspective, the liquidity in circulation 
decreases, but the original credit relations and the connected payment commitments continue to 
exist. While the financial solidity of commercial banks apparently improves, overall 
macroeconomic solidity certainly does not (see again Appendix A on this point).  
Indeed, also in the traditional circuit initial money may be eventually destroyed without 
necessarily implying a corresponding reduction in someone else debt. This happens when final 
finance is provided to original borrowers through financial markets’ intermediations. In this event, 
the exit of money from the circuit explicitly transforms initial debtors’ obligations towards 
commercial banks into obligations towards market-based institutions/final savers. Still, this 
transformation helps initial borrowers to make their financial positions more reliable insofar as final 
obligations take the form of equities. Such a transformation does not happen any longer through 
securitization. Liquidity is destroyed, but there is not any change in the nature of the initial debt 
obligations. The only change is simply in the explicit or implicit ownership of these very same 
credits. 
Second, the set of proceeds left by this circuit, and more in general subtending the relation 
between the financial and the household sector, is detrimental for the latter. It is well known that 
banks apply an interest on deposits lower than the one they receive on loans. Furthermore, the 
securitization of mortgages not only determines the level of liquidity of assets, it also transforms 
their quality. As described by Pozsar Z. et al. (2013), ABSs and shares of MMMFs are both more 
liquid and considered more secure than their underlying assets. Since interest rates decrease 
together with the level of perceived risk, financial engineering has allowed the financial sectors to 
make profits out of interest differentials. If credit was households’ only source of income, it would 
be obvious that they would unescapably be in a Ponzi position, requiring new credit to repay past 
financial commitments. The same exact logic applies to the value of assets, which will increase with 
any step of the securitization process. This price and interest rate differentials determine the profits 
of the financial system. These profits, in particular those arising from price differentials, 
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immediately rise some difficulties, since they emerge within the circuit. The difference between the 
price paid by the household sector to purchase financial assets (Sh) and the money used by financial 
intermediates to buy ‘securitized’ credit positions from banks, will not be immediately destroyed. It 
will therefore remain in the economy and will be used according to the decision of the profit 
earners. Buying further financial assets is only one of the possibilities.  
The financial system does not need to use exclusively money collected by selling shares to 
households. Indeed, we should also think about the kind of inner-finance circuit already sketched in 
Section 3. It represents the second of our financial circuits. Such an inner-finance circuit takes place 
when commercial banks stretch liquidity to brokers and dealers through REPOs, which in turn use 
these funds to purchase ABSs. This is a self-feeding circle. On the one hand, commercial banks 
indirectly ‘produce’ and supply ABSs to be sold to investment banks. On the other hand, 
commercial banks may provide investment banks with the required money to buy ABSs, hence 
stimulating ABS demand. The apparent endless and explosive nature of this circuit is clear. 
Securitization figuratively allows commercial banks to act more aggressively on financial markets 
and thus to provide liquidity to investment banks. Investment banks have access to REPOs by using 
ABSs as collaterals. Interestingly, into this inside-finance circuit money may be continuously 
created and destroyed without entering in contact with any real side institutions. This pure inside-
finance dynamic may significantly contribute to financial hyperactivity, financial bubbles, and 
financial asset inflation as theorized by Toporowsky (2000), and described by Cingolani (2013) in 
the case of the European Union. Needless to say, this cycle strongly relies on financial operators’ 
confidence in ABSs as safe and liquid assets. In the Keynesian jargon, we might say that the abrupt 
break-up of these conventions in August 2007 turned bulls into bears and led to complete financial 
and credit markets’ collapse. The above inside-finance circuit dried up.  
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4.1 Enriching the picture 
Some more points are worth stressing in order to enrich the description of our financialized 
monetary circuit. They mostly concern the financial position of households in the era of 
financialization. 
Households get money from commercial banks, directly or indirectly, in a multiplicity of ways. 
They receive wages from firms, interest income on previously accumulated wealth, new money 
provided by commercial banks through new loans and mortgages. Households may decide to use 
the money they got from banks in different ways, exerting different impacts on the economy. Let us 
first assume that households mostly use new inflows of money from commercial banks in order to 
buy consumption goods in excess of wage income. Hence, it nourishes one of the possible sources 
through which firms can obtain the final finance they need to close the traditional circuit, namely 
the proceeds deriving from the sale of the goods produced. This also allows overcoming the 
difficulties in the identification of the source of profit or interest repayment characterizing of the 
original circuit (Parguez, 2003; Zezza, 2004; Messori and Zazzaro, 2004; Rochon 2005).   
On the contrary, in the event that the value of the consumption goods purchased by households 
does not exceed nominal wage, households will have the chance to repay the loan using their labour 
income. The new inflow of money, in this case, would only serve to ease the circulation of 
commodities- anticipating the mean of payment – and will exert no impact on the balance sheets of 
the sectors. Also in the case money is used to purchase the securities of non-financial firms, this 
new money will determine a source of funds for the traditional circuit to close. Nevertheless, the 
dynamic identified by Graziani (2003, p. 29) according to which ‘the money that wage earners 
spend in the commodities market, as well as money spent in the financial market on the purchase of 
securities, flows back to the firms’ takes place with two key differences. First, the purchasers of 
commodities are not pure wage earners and might be better labeled as ‘indebted consumers’ 
(Bellofiore, 2013). Second, when money is spent to buy securities, money does not flow back to the 
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same sector that received it as the initial financial; it is rather channelled from the households to the 
non-financial sector, leaving the former indebted.  
Alternatively, part of households’ financial wealth may take the form of commercial banks’ 
deposits. If we neglect for a while the effects of increasing household debt on the possibly positive 
net financial position of the overall non-financial business sector, the more households’ savings 
consist of demand deposits, the less non-financial firms (at least part of them!) will repay their own 
initial debt. In this case, Graziani’s perspective still holds true when, in line with Steindl’s ‘enforced 
indebtedness’ (Steindl, 1952), he identified in money balances (notes or deposits) a barrier for the 
circuit to close (see Graziani, 2003). 
Finally, the case in which households decide to purchase existing dwellings does not seem 
particularly relevant, being only an intrasectoral exchange of assets with the ownership of dwellings 
and deposits reversed. Nonetheless, real estate purchasing did play a key role in the US economy. 
The inflow of money, passing though the real estate market, determine the price of the houses, 
which in many cases are the assets households hold as collateral against mortgage and loan 
liabilities that do not disappear with the end of the financial circuit, but rather ‘distributed’ into 
financial markets. As mentioned before, a peculiarity of our financial circuit is that even though 
money is eventually destroyed through securitization, households’ debt position is still pending (and 
unchanged). Such a debt needs to be repaid. If we do not assume that the households sector is able 
to save – an assumption that will leave the original circuit open, hence only moving the problem – 
they will need recurring to new debt to meet their financial needs. This self-reinforcing dynamic 
relies on the need for continuous access to credit, which in turn depends on the increase in value of 
the underlying assets used by households to back loans, namely houses. This indebtedness spiral is 
potentially endless and will continue as long as fuelled by new credit. At the micro level, it becomes 
sustainable with the selling of the dwelling.  
Ultimately, thanks to the rising value of houses, the single household unit will be able to meet its 
financial obligations by selling its house and obtaining the required liquidity to repay its (original or 
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refinanced) debt back. This is the reflux of this financial circuit. Nonetheless, at the macro level, the 
provision of final finance (commodity or securities selling in the original version) now corresponds 
to the opening of a new circuit, i.e. loans provided to those households who buy houses. This shows 
the fragility of this system, based on mortgage issuing and overall households’ debt. It requires an 
ever-lively demand for dwellings and increasing house price, as noted by Gorton (2010). 
Last but not least, we can distinguish two classes of households, as done in Matrices 2a/2b and 
3a/3b. On the one hand, workers live exclusively out of their wage income and get indebted towards 
banks. On the other hand, rentiers also receive interest income from the ownership of financial 
assets (in our example distributed profits and interests on shares), on top of usually higher wage. 
This assumption can hardly be considered as unrealistic, since that income inequality is a well-
established stylized fact (see Piketty, 2014) which, according to several authors, have played a key 
role in the way towards the subprime crisis which have recently shattered the financialized 
economies depicted in this paper (Van Treeck, 2013). In practice, we deal with a class of rentiers 
that extrapolates wealth from the financial circuit, whilst the other class, workers, needs access to 
credit to sustain a process in which they are at best a channel through which money, which springs 
from commercial banks flows to rentiers. In canalizing money, workers are allowed for a certain 
level of well-being since they can consume and have a house. However, such a well-being is 
ultimately transitory and does not transform into (permanent) wealth since the dwelling will need to 
be sold to keep the scheme working.  
 
5. Conclusions 
In the last decades, the financial system experienced a terrific growth, whose impact on the real side 
of the economy has been the object of several studies. However, the financial system has mostly 
been treated as an aggregated homogeneous entity, or alternatively described from a micro 
perspective without paying attention to the macroeconomic implications of new micro-level 
strategies. This paper tries to lift the veil over the financial side of the economy in order to portray 
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in more details its inner dynamics and include them in a macroeconomic framework. In order to 
reach this goal, we rely on the monetary circuit theory (MCT). The MCT, originally focusing on the 
role of bank money in allowing production processes to take place, is highly informative if applied 
to an insightful representation of the balance sheet interconnections underlying the dynamics of 
finance, both inside the financial system itself and with respect to the real side of the economy. 
Next to a schematic representation of the financial system, we identify two new circuits in which 
the creation of money is detached by standard production processes. These circuits appear as highly 
unstable since they require a continuous influx of money (i.e. new debt). In our analysis, instability 
eventually appears to be the major problem for the economy as a whole arising from the 
aforementioned financial dynamics.  
Under a circuitist perspective in which money is endogenous, we do not find an immediate 
negative impact of the financialized circuits on economic growth. In particular, there is no 
automatic crowding out effect of productive investment in favor of financial speculation. 
Nonetheless, these new circuits, as well as the practice of commodification of credit around which 
they evolve, are potentially very harmful for the economy. The high demand of financial assets, in 
particular securitized debt, from brokers and dealers and investment funds, pushed the banking 
sector to issue credit and to sell it - once securitized - through the SPV. This demand-led dynamic 
stimulated the production of financial assets and had its counterpart in the increasing indebtedness 
of the household sector and the increasing fragility of the economy as a whole. This is linked to the 
second real side problem arising from the financial circuits. The securitization of credit feeds 
income inequality. The indebtedness of workers is functional to the financial returns of rentiers. 
This is a self-reinforcing dynamics, inherent to the balance sheets of the two households sectors. 
Commodified financial instruments channel financial resources from the sector holding a liability to 
the sector holding the correspondent assets. The net position of debtor and creditor, respectively of 
households and rentiers vis à vis the financial markets, determine an continuous flux of money from 
the former to the latter. 
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A final intriguing result of our paper refers to the concept of financialization, whose definition is 
often unclear and non univocal. In a monetary theory of production, financialization can be 
conceived, and could be defined, as a shift of the main channel of money creation from real 
production to financial speculation. 
This paper sheds light on the financial system from a specific perspective, the one of the financial 
circuit. Not surprisingly, significant parts of the issue remain nebulous and would need further 
investigation. In particular, we plan with future works to deepen our analysis on the role of central 
banks and income distribution. 
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FIGURES AND MATRICES 
 
 
Figure 1 – Financial sector’s total assets value over GDP. 
 
Source: FED’s Flow of Funds (Z1) and authors’ computation. 
 
 
 
Figure 2 – Financial operators’ shares of total financial assets. 
 
Source: FED’s Flow of Funds (Z1) and authors’ computation 
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Figure 3 – Financial operators’ main assets (as a share of total assets).  
 
Source: FED’s Flow of Funds (Z1) and authors’ computation. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4 – Sub-groups of ‘credit market instruments’ (shares).  
 
Source: FED’s Flow of Funds (Z1) and authors’ computation. 
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Figure 5 – Stocks of REPOs in financial sectors’ and broker and dealers’ balance sheets (as a share 
of GDP), assets and liabilities.  
 
Source: FED’s Flow of Funds (Z1) and authors’ computation. 
 
 
Figure 6 – Composition of commercial banks’ balance sheet (shares).  
Source: FED’s Flow of Funds (Z1) and authors’ computation.    
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Figure 7 – Private non-financial sectors’ liabilities (share of GDP).  
 
Source: FED’s Flow of Funds (Z1) and authors’ computation.    
 
 
 
 
Figure 8 – MMMFs’ assets as a share of total financial sector’s assets and of GDP. 
 
Source: FED’s Flow of Funds (Z1) and authors’ computation. 
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Figure 9 – Asset-backed security issuers’ assets as a share of total financial sector’s assets and of 
GDP.  
 
Source: FED’s Flow of Funds (Z1) and authors’ computation.    
 
 
 
 
Figure 10 – Broker and Dealers’ assets as a share of total financial sector’s assets and of GDP.  
 
Source: FED’s Flow of Funds (Z1) and authors’ computation.    
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Figure 11 – Investment Funds’ assets as a share of total financial sector’s assets and of GDP.  
 
Source: FED’s Flow of Funds (Z1) and authors’ computation.    
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Figure 12 – Real-side and financial-side interactions in a traditional monetary circuit. 
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Figure 13 – An extended financialized monetary circuit 
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APPENDIX A 
 
Let assume a simple economy in which there are five actors: households (HH), rentiers, Money 
Market Mutual Funds (MMMF), Special Purpose Vehicles (SPV), and commercial banks. For the 
sake of simplicity, we do not consider production. We focus on the distribution of assets and 
liabilities among actors, and the way through which assets may be transferred from one another. 
Five assets are initially assumed to exist: mortgages (M), demand deposits (D), banks’ reserves (R), 
banks’ equities (PE), and houses (PH). Two additional assets are introduced later on when 
securitization and inside-finance transactions are taken into account: MMMFs’ shares (Sh) and 
asset-backed securities (ABS). Matrix A1 below provides a hypothetical numerical configuration of 
such economy.  
 
 
  
 
Let assume that at the end of time t0 households own houses whose value is 200$. In order to buy 
houses from rentiers, they have previously got indebted with banks for the same amount. Such a 
financial relationship appears on the liability side of households’ balance sheets and on the asset 
side of commercial banks’ balance sheets. Financial resources obtained from banks have been 
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subsequently moved to rentiers, who in turn deposited them on their own bank account. Rentiers 
also own houses for 300$, as well as equities originally issued by banks whose value is 100$. Total 
rentiers’ original or primary wealth amounts to 600$. We assume initial commercial banks’ 
provision by equity issuing to be stored in the form of reserves. MMMFs and SPV do not play any 
role on the onset. 
Now assume that at time t1, households buy additional houses from rentiers for an amount equal 
to 100$. In order to do so, they get additional loans from banks for the same amount. After this 
transaction is completed, 100$ more are credited on rentiers’ bank deposits. Should the traditional 
‘originate and hold’ practice still prevail, changes in the creation of financial relationships and in 
the distribution of assets would stop here. Banks would have observed a 100$ increase in their 
assets’ value. Correspondingly, banks’ liabilities in the form of demand deposits would have 
increased by the same amount. Thus, banks’ economic activity would have expanded. Nevertheless, 
given the initial financial provision from rentiers’ (100$), banks’ leverage would have increased as 
well, and banks’ financial solidity weakened. 
The move from ‘originate and hold’ practices to securitization implies three new phases and 
financial relationships to emerge. At time t2, we assume that rentiers exchange banks’ deposits for 
MMMFs shares. Rentiers’ deposits decrease by 100$ whilst rentiers now hold 100$ more in the 
form of MMMFs shares. MMMFs are credited with 100$ banks deposits while issuing liabilities for 
the same amount. From an aggregated perspective, nothing changes from the point of view of 
commercial banks (there has only been a change in the ownership of banks deposits). At time t3, 
SPVs issue ABSs. MMMFs buy 100$ value ABSs by transferring 100$ on SPVs’ bank account. 
The final step of securitization takes place at time t4 when commercial banks sell 100$ value assets 
to SPVs that in turn pay asset purchases by extinguishing their own bank deposit. At the end of time 
t4, banks’ assets are thus moved off their balance sheet and passed into SPVs balance sheets. 
Through this passage, even though bank money created at time t1 is destroyed, the corresponding 
assets are still around in the economy. 
From an aggregated point of view, whilst new financial assets have been created by commercial 
banks and allocated somewhere in the economic system, commercial banks retain larger margins of 
maneuver to further expand their business. On the one hand, their profitability is increased, since 
that they still earn fees for servicing payments commitments linked to securitized assets (this 
transaction is not reported in matrix A1). On the other hand, commercial banks’ leverage is not 
changed at all from t0 to t4. It is even lower than financial exposure theoretically emerging from a 
traditional ‘originate and hold’ practice (see step t1). It goes without saying that commercial banks 
can now operate more aggressively on financial markets, and give rise to a new round of ‘originate 
and distribute’. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 54 
APPENDIX B 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 55 
 
 
 
 
 
 56 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 57 
 
